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DECOUPLING VACCINE LAWS 
DORIT RUBINSTEIN REISS* 
Abstract: School immunization requirements are an effective way of increasing 
vaccine rates and reducing outbreaks, but they may have a dark underside. Alt-
hough such mandates protect the general public, the availability of exemptions 
may be open to exploitation as a tool to try to undermine other avenues for pro-
tecting the vaccine-deprived children themselves. This essay argues that exemp-
tions from school immunization requirements should not be understood to limit 
the protections available to children due to a decision to withhold vaccines. The 
existence of an exemption should, however, prevent criminal prosecution if a 
child dies from a preventable disease, because a parent can justifiably believe 
they were acting legally. 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following set of facts: parents decide based on their religious 
beliefs that they will not vaccinate their newborn baby.1 Although they have 
vaccinated their older child, this is their decision. The child is taken for routine 
pediatric visits at two, four, and six months of age; the doctor tries unsuccess-
fully to persuade the parents to vaccinate on each occasion. Their state requires 
certain vaccines to attend daycare but allows a religious exemption, which the 
parents have obtained, and the child begins daycare at the age of six months. 
At eleven months of age, the child develops meningitis caused by Streptococ-
cus pneumoniae. The particular strain of bacteria that causes the meningitis is 
contained in the pneumococcal vaccine normally required for daycare attend-
ance, and the infection could have been prevented had the parents chosen to 
immunize. The case is severe, causing the baby’s brain to press down on the 
brainstem. The child stops breathing but is successfully resuscitated and sur-
vives. However, the child will never see, walk, speak, or hear again. 
School immunization requirements are an effective way of increasing 
vaccine rates and reducing outbreaks,2 but they may have a dark underside. 
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 1 This scenario is based on discussions and anecdotes of practicing physicians. For a discussion of 
the position of various religions’ positions on vaccination, see Dorit R. Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the 
Name of the Lord Thy God in Vain: Use and Abuse of Religious Exemptions from School Immuniza-
tion Requirements, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1551 (2014). 
 2 See Nina R. Blank et al., Exempting Schoolchildren from Immunizations: States with Few Bar-
riers Had Highest Rates of Nonmedical Exemptions, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1282, 1282 (2013); James 
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Although such mandates protect the general public, the availability of exemp-
tions may be open to exploitation as a tool to try to undermine other avenues 
for protecting the vaccine-deprived children themselves. The argument of the 
exempting parent in the case above would be that by providing an exemption 
from school immunization requirements, the state is accepting refusal to vac-
cinate as a legitimate choice and thereby creating an individual parental right. 
That right, goes this argument, overrides the right of the child to be protected 
from disease and the rights of other individuals to be protected from the risks 
of nonvaccination. Other legal avenues—including civil and criminal actions 
against the nonvaccinating parents over the decision not to vaccinate—would 
therefore be precluded. 
Taken as an overarching principle, this argument could imply that: 
• a child could not bring suit in tort for harm due to a parent’s refusal to 
vaccinate, so long as the parent has an exemption; 
• hospital personnel could not go to court to seek a judicial order to vac-
cinate if they think a child was at risk of direct harm from not vaccinating 
if the parent has an exemption; 
• a parent who wanted to vaccinate would be unable to obtain a judicial or-
der to vaccinate over the opposition of the other parent if there is a legit-
imate exemption available; 
• if a child died because of parental nonvaccination, no criminal action 
would be available against the parents; and 
• other parents could not sue a nonvaccinating parent if their child were 
demonstrably harmed by that parent’s decision not to vaccinate. 
Such an argument could severely limit the tools available to protect chil-
dren from vaccine-preventable diseases—and, with the exception of criminal 
law, is incorrect. Legally, the argument is faulty because school immunization 
requirements are generally predicated on public health—that is, achieving high 
enough rates of vaccination to preserve community immunity—not on protect-
ing individual children from parental refusals to vaccinate. Specifically, it is 
incorrect in relation to tort liability because acting legally is not always acting 
reasonably. Furthermore, this argument is incorrect in relation to injunctions in 
the context of healthcare providers and family law because such injunctions 
provide judges with wide discretion to act in a child’s best interest, beyond that 
which is explicitly spelled out in statute. Acceptance of this argument would 
also represent poor public policy, because it implies that children should be 
deprived of potential compensation and protection against disease on the basis 
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of statutes passed without in-depth consideration of the children’s interests and 
individual situations. 
Our jurisprudence revolves around three questions: first, if a child harmed 
by his or her parents’ decision not to vaccinate—personally, or through a 
guardian or next friend—sued the parents for damages in tort, would the exist-
ence of a religious exemption prevent compensation? Second, what if, before 
the harm occurred, one parent wanted to vaccinate and appealed to the courts; 
would the existence of a religious exemption to school immunization require-
ments prevent granting that parent’s request even if the court concluded that 
vaccinating was in the child’s best interests? Last, if the state wanted to crimi-
nally prosecute the parents for the preventable harm to the child, would the 
religious exemption provide a defense, and should it? I will argue that exemp-
tions from school immunization requirements should not be understood to lim-
it the protections available to children due to a decision to withhold vaccines. 
These are two separate issues that should be treated separately. The existence 
of an exemption should, however, prevent criminal prosecution if a child dies 
from a preventable disease, because a parent can justifiably believe they were 
acting legally. Our courts have in the past rejected attempts to criminally pros-
ecute parents exercising such exemptions—and rightly so.3 
This Essay proceeds in three parts. The first reviews the history of exemp-
tions, explaining that the discussions focused on the risk to the public from the 
unvaccinated children, not on protecting children themselves from their par-
ents’ decisions. The second part explains why such laws should not prevent 
liability in tort or prevent courts from requiring immunization in appropriate 
cases. The final part explains why criminal law is different, and why a parent 
using an exemption should be protected from criminal prosecution if a child 
(whether theirs or another’s) is harmed, and suggests that if this is to change, 
legislative action is needed, including clear notice to exempting parents. 
I. WHY EXEMPTIONS? 
It is important to keep in mind that exemptions from school immunization 
requirements are not based on any in-depth consideration of the rights of the 
child. This is reflected in both legislative debates and jurisprudence. Similarly, 
the rationale for school immunization requirements has generally been the 
public good, not the individual health of unimmunized children.4 Neither were 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See In re Maria R., 366 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (Fam. Ct. 1975); see also State v. Miday, 140 S.E.2d 
325, 329 (N.C. 1965) (holding that conviction under North Carolina’s compulsory school attendance 
statute was improper where defendant father kept his son out of school in the good faith belief that he 
was within the rights provided him by the statute’s religious exemption from inoculation require-
ments). 
 4 In the 1960s, the focus was sometimes on fiscal health. See JAMES COLGROVE, STATE OF 
IMMUNITY: THE POLITICS OF VACCINATION IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 174–75 (2006). 
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exemptions added out of concern for the health of individual children. The ar-
gument for exemptions in the 1960s and 1970s, when most school immuniza-
tion laws and the accompanying exemptions were passed, was to protect par-
ents’ religious scruples, “largely in response to the lobbying efforts of Chris-
tian Scientists.”5 The interests of children left unvaccinated were not the focus 
of these discussions. 
Attention was only paid to the effects on unvaccinated children when 
events dramatically and vividly demonstrated the risk to such children from the 
existence of exemptions, and even then, only to a limited degree. This hap-
pened, for example, in a 1972 outbreak of polio at Daycroft, a Christian Scien-
tist boarding school in Connecticut, after years in which the nation had seen 
very few cases. Eleven unvaccinated children aged seven to eighteen were af-
flicted, with nine left paralyzed.6 This outbreak led to at least one reply calling 
into question the legitimacy of the exemption.7 
Exemptions, in other words, were not created to protect children. Their 
passage did not involve serious discussion of whether they do or do not protect 
the exempted children. They were part and parcel of an effort to protect the 
public health and were a political judgment that the public health would not be 
endangered by accommodating the beliefs of a minority of parents—even if 
those beliefs were mistaken, without basis, or against the interests of the chil-
dren left unvaccinated. The effect on unvaccinated children was an incidental 
matter. 
A look at the related jurisprudence reinforces this. In Zucht v. King, the 
first case to address school immunization mandates, the Supreme Court of the 
United States focused on the state’s power to protect the public health, not the 
health of the child—the latter interest, again, was secondary.8 No case has in-
terpreted exemptions as existing to protect children. In Workman v. Mingo 
County Board of Education, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
highlighted that the jurisprudence emphasized community welfare over indi-
vidual rights.9 Most recently, in Phillips v. New York, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit stated the following: 
The [Supreme] Court rejected the claim that the individual liberty 
guaranteed by the Constitution overcame the State’s judgment that 
mandatory vaccination was in the interest of the population as a 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Id. at 180. 
 6 See Louis Weinstein, Poliomyelitis—A Persistent Problem, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 370 
(1973). 
 7 See Stanley W. Ferguson, Mandatory Immunization, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 800 (1973). 
 8 See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922) (noting that compulsory vaccination ordinances 
confer on municipalities the broad discretion necessary to protect public health). 
 9 See Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 09–2352, 2011 WL 1042330 at **4–6 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
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whole. Plaintiffs argue that a growing body of scientific evidence 
demonstrates that vaccines cause more harm to society than good, 
but as Jacobson made clear, that is a determination for the legisla-
ture, not the individual objectors.10 
On the rare occasions in which examinations of school immunization re-
quirements have explicitly addressed the interests of the child, the courts 
strongly supported the child being vaccinated. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the 
Supreme Court’s explanation of why mandatory vaccination is constitutional 
even in the face of parental religious objections relied in part on protecting the 
child from being exposed “to communicable disease or . . . to ill health or 
death.”11 The Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Stone striking 
down the state’s religious exemption was also based in part on protecting chil-
dren from disease.12 In no case has an exemption been upheld on the grounds 
that it is fundamentally in the interest of the child in question—quite the oppo-
site. Exemptions have been upheld as part of the state’s power to balance pub-
lic health with the rights of parents, but each case that has confronted the issue 
has emphasized the public health rationale. 
In short, the focus of legal considerations of nonmedical exemptions to 
school immunization requirements has clearly not been the protection of indi-
vidual children, much less allowing parents to harm their children. To infer a 
parental right to leave children unvaccinated, and thus at risk of disease, is to 
read more into statute and judicial interpretations than is plausible. Moreover, 
any attempt to use such a hypothetical right to deny children protection from 
other bodies of law would be unfair, as addressed below. 
II. EXEMPTIONS AND THE CIVIL PROTECTIONS OF  
UNVACCINATED CHILDREN 
While a detailed discussion of the legal tools available to protect children 
from the harms of withholding vaccination is beyond the scope of this Essay,13 
this section outlines why exemptions should preclude neither tort liability nor 
court intervention in favor of vaccination, whether at the request of one parent 
against the other or against the will of both, in appropriate circumstances. 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 542 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (citations omitted), cert. 
denied, 136 S.Ct. 104 (2015). 
 11 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944). 
 12 See Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 221 (Miss. 1979) (“Is it mandated by the First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution that innocent children, too young to decide for themselves, are 
to be denied the protection against crippling and death that immunization provides because of a reli-
gious belief adhered to by a parent or parents?”). 
 13 See generally Dorit R. Reiss & Lois A. Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination 
Crisis: Legal Frameworks and Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine Refusal, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 
881, 952–79 (2015). 
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Because the interests of the child have not historically been part of the 
discussion of school immunization requirements, using exemptions to deny 
children compensation from tort liability is inappropriate. I have previously 
argued that there is no reason to presume any legislative intent to shield such 
parents from tort liability: 
[T]he legislature, in allowing parents to send children to public 
school without immunization, may not have intended to shield them 
from liability if another is harmed by the parents’ choice. The con-
siderations are different. In allowing religious or philosophical ex-
emptions, the state is deciding which reasons justify allowing the 
child to attend school, even at the risk of exposing others. The 
child’s right to an education and the interest of the state in having 
educated citizens are important considerations . . . . Those rights are 
not at stake when deciding whether to compensate those hurt by 
failure to vaccinate.14 
Furthermore, 
[A]cting legally is not necessarily acting reasonably. It is legal to 
have a pile of hay on your property, but it might be unreasonable. It 
was legal to use non-tempered glass in shower enclosures in New 
York before 1973, but that did not make it reasonable.15 
Similar rationales apply to courts’ authority to order vaccination against 
the parents’ will. The available rationale in such a case is finding the harm 
from not vaccinating to be high enough to override the medical choice of oth-
erwise competent guardians—a rare event.16 Imagine, for example, parents 
refusing to protect a child with cystic fibrosis from respiratory illnesses. Par-
ents have a duty to provide medical aid to their children, which courts can and 
have enforced, up to the point of appointing a guardian or overruling parental 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Dorit R. Reiss, Compensating the Victims of Failure to Vaccinate: What Are the Options?, 23 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 595, 617–18 (2014) (footnotes omitted). 
 15 Id. at 618 (footnotes omitted). 
 16 One such case is a Kings County Family Court decision out of New York in 1992. See In re 
Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 618 (Fam. Ct. 1992) (finding that a parent’s failure to vaccinate his 
child against measles in the midst of an outbreak caused the child to become a “neglected child” with-
in the statutory meaning, but ultimately declining to “utilize its discretionary power to order inocula-
tion” because the “urgency” of the outbreak had subsided). Another case, this one in Philadelphia in 
the 1990s, is mentioned in PAUL A. OFFIT, BAD FAITH: WHEN RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDERMINES 
MODERN MEDICINE 110 (2015) (describing an order by a Philadelphia judge to vaccinate children 
over parental objection after several children died in a religious group that opposes vaccination). 
There may conceivably be additional cases—for example, cases of children whose mother was hepati-
tis B positive and refused to vaccinate her newborn, who is at high risk; or cases of children bitten by 
an unknown dog whose parents refuse the rabies vaccine. 
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decisions.17 There is no reason to think that a school immunization require-
ment, passed with a focus on public health, was aimed at denying children life-
saving vaccines in high-risk situations or at providing support to a parent who, 
against the scientific evidence, wants to deny a child protection from disease 
when the other parent objects. 
Similarly, when there is a custody issue, the interests of the child support 
allowing vaccination when there is a dispute. The risks of vaccines are real, but 
very small, and for each vaccine on the recommended schedule, the risks of 
not vaccinating outweigh those of the disease.18 Despite this, one could argue 
that the very existence of an exemption justifies not vaccinating. But using an 
exemption aimed at school age children to refuse vaccinating infants is unper-
suasive and, even at school age, there is no basis to claim that the legislature 
intended to deny custodians the ability to make this medical particular decision 
that serves the child’s interest. Most courts have correctly been supportive of 
vaccinating when there exists cause to allocate power and examine guardian-
ship. In one line of cases across states, courts have found that if a parent loses 
custody of a child and the child becomes a ward of the state, the state can vac-
cinate over the parent’s objection even if there is a legal exemption otherwise 
available to the parent.19 The same logic should apply when one parent seeks 
to vaccinate and the other opposes.20 The existence of an exemption should not 
lead courts to act in a way that goes against the child’s best interest, and being 
protected from the much larger risk of not vaccinating is in the child’s best in-
terest. 
III. CRIMINAL LAW IS DIFFERENT 
In the early 1950s and 1960s, criminal law was used against parents who 
did not vaccinate their children by means of truancy statutes.21 But even then, 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 659 (Fam. Ct. 1970), aff’d, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. 
Div. 1971), aff’d, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972); In re S.H., No. 13CA0066–M, 2013 WL 5519847, at 
*11 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (holding that when parents cannot or will not consent to a minor’s potential-
ly life-saving treatment, someone may be appointed by the court to approve the procedure in the inter-
est of the child’s life and health). 
 18 See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 13, at 886–88; see also Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vac-
cinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children? 37 MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 353, 392–93 (2004). 
 19 These states include Oregon, Dept. of Human Serv. v. S.M, 323 P.3d 947, 954–55 (Or. 2014); 
North Carolina, In re Stratton, 571 S.E.2d 234, 238 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002), rev. den., 573 S.E.2d 512 
(N.C. 2002); and Georgia, In re C.R., 570 S.E.2d 609, 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). The only exception, 
to this author’s knowledge, is a 2–1 Arizona Court of Appeals decision over a strong dissent. See 
Diana H. v. Rubin, 171 P.3d 200, 209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
 20 In at least one case, that was not done. See Grzyb v. Grzyb, 79 Va. Cir. 93 (2009). Other cases 
have found differently. See Welker v. Welker, 129 N.W.2d 134, 138 (Wis. 1964). 
 21 See Anderson v. State, 65 S.E.2d 848, 852 (Ga. Crt. App. 1951); State v. Drew, 192 A. 629, 
632 (N.H. 1937). 
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if a parent had a legitimate exemption available, no conviction would ensue.22 
There is good reason for this, at least for parents who actively obtained an ex-
emption.23 Every state has procedures to obtain an exemption from school vac-
cination requirements. A parent who has gone through those procedures and 
obtained an exemption could justifiably believe that they are acting fully with-
in the law when refusing to vaccinate their children. For the state that issued 
the exemption to then turn around and bring a criminal prosecution against 
exemption-holding parents is intuitively unfair. 
On a related issue—whether a faith healing exemption from murder or 
manslaughter statutes protected a parent from criminal prosecution—courts 
have been split. Some courts have found that due process requires exonerating 
the parents, who did not have fair warning that their choice was criminal.24 
Others have found that the parent using faith healing acts at her peril, and may 
be prosecuted if the child dies.25 Here, however, the case against prosecution is 
even stronger. Non-vaccinating parents can claim—with some justification—
that they have been led by the state to believe their actions were not criminal. 
They cannot make such a claim in tort, because one is presumed to know that 
what is legal is not always reasonable. Injunctions to vaccinate are prospective 
and do not carry the same after-the-fact penalty, but criminal prosecutions 
seem unfair in these circumstances—at least, without something more. For 
example, a parent participating in a so-called chicken pox party might be vul-
nerable to prosecution, because the exemption does not cover intentionally 
sickening one’s child. 26 
Legislatures can, of course, choose to deviate from this scheme and allow 
for criminal prosecution by explicitly including language in the exemption law 
which clarifies that the grant of an exemption does not preclude criminal pros-
ecution, and mandating inclusion of such language on the documents required 
to obtain an exemption. Without explicit warning, however, criminal prosecu-
tion is unfair. 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See In re Maria R., 366 N.Y.S.2d 309, 309 (Fam. Ct. 1975); State v. Miday, 140 S.E.2d 325, 
329 (N.C. 1965). 
 23 A separate but interesting question is presented by parents who qualify for an exemption but 
fail to seek or obtain one. 
 24 See Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 782 (Fla. 1992); State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 
69 (Minn. 1991); State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931, 937–38 (Ohio C.P. 1984). 
 25 Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 871–72 (Cal. 1988); Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433, 
435 (Ind. 1986); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616, 624–25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
 26 Christine Vara, Think Chickenpox Is Party Worthy? Think Again, SHOT OF PREVENTION (Aug. 
13, 2013), http://shotofprevention.com/2013/08/13/think-chickenpox-is-party-worthy-think-again 
[https://perma.cc/Z33V-ARV3]. 
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CONCLUSION 
Vaccines protect children’s lives at very low risk compared with the dis-
eases they protect against. When parents, in the absence of a bona fide medical 
contraindication, choose not to vaccinate—whatever their reasons, and howev-
er much they think they are acting for the benefit of their child—they are 
choosing the greater risk. The legal tools available to protect children from 
paying the often-high price of that choice are limited, but they do exist. They 
should not be artificially limited or barred because legislatures, balancing pa-
rental rights with preventing outbreaks, have allowed limited belief-based ex-
emptions from school immunization requirements. Exemption statutes are not 
predicated on the interests of unvaccinated children, who are incidental to the 
discussion. Because the child’s interest is not the focus, using those statutes to 
undermine the routine civil protections available to such children is unfair and 
should not be done. Children are vulnerable as it is; the law should protect 
them more, not less. 
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